• DocumentCode
    180756
  • Title

    Cryptographically secure shields

  • Author

    Cioranesco, Jean-Michel ; Danger, Jean-Luc ; Graba, Tarik ; Guilley, Sylvain ; Mathieu, Yves ; Naccache, David ; Xuan Thuy Ngo

  • Author_Institution
    Sorbonne Univ., Paris, France
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    6-7 May 2014
  • Firstpage
    25
  • Lastpage
    31
  • Abstract
    Probing attacks are serious threats on integrated circuits. Security products often include a protective layer called shield that acts like a digital fence. In this article, we demonstrate a new shield structure that is cryptographically secure. This shield is based on the newly proposed SIMON lightweight block cipher and independent mesh lines to ensure the security against probing attacks of the hardware located behind the shield. Such structure can be proven secure against state-of-the-art invasive attacks. For the first time in the open literature, we describe a chip designed with a digital shield, and give an extensive report of its cost, in terms of power, metal layer(s) to sacrifice and of logic (including the logic to connect it to the CPU). Also, we explain how “Through Silicon Vias” (TSV) technology can be used for the protection against both frontside and backside probing.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; integrated circuit design; three-dimensional integrated circuits; SIMON lightweight block cipher; TSV technology; chip design; cryptographical secure shield; digital fence; digital shield; integrated circuit; invasive attacks; mesh lines; metal layer; probing attacks; protective layer; security product; shield structure; through silicon vias; Ciphers; Integrated circuits; Metals; Registers; Routing; Cryptographically secure shield; Focused Ion Beam (FIB); SIMON block cipher; Through Silicon Vias (TSV);
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Arlington, VA
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-4114-8
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/HST.2014.6855563
  • Filename
    6855563