DocumentCode
180760
Title
On design of a highly secure PUF based on non-linear current mirrors
Author
Kumar, Ravindra ; Burleson, Wayne
Author_Institution
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA
fYear
2014
fDate
6-7 May 2014
Firstpage
38
Lastpage
43
Abstract
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are lightweight hardware security primitives for generating unique signatures from the unpredictable nature of silicon. However, most of the proposed PUFs have been shown to be vulnerable to modeling attacks, especially against Machine Learning algorithms. A subset of challenge-response pairs can leak the required information to break a PUF due to the presence of a linear separating boundary between the PUF responses. In this paper, we propose a strong and secure PUF based on non-linear current mirrors. The fundamental idea is to propagate a current through two identical chains of non-linear current mirrors. The current through a single stage is shifted by some amount based on the strength of the input current. As the current shift is not a fixed value anymore, strong non-linearity is introduced into the challenge-response relationship. The proposed PUF shows excellent properties upon statistical circuit simulation. The average inter-distance and intra-distance of the proposed PUF are 49.9% and 0.8% respectively. One of the most striking features of the proposed PUF is the low information leakage measured in terms of its modeling attack resistance. By employing Support Vector Machine (SVM) based attacks, we observed that the proposed PUF is almost 10-30x stronger than the delay-based PUFs. Moreover, the current mode nature of the PUF circuit enables low power operation. The proposed PUF consumes about 15% lower energy than an arbiter PUF to produce a single response bit.
Keywords
circuit simulation; current mirrors; digital signatures; electronic engineering computing; integrated circuit manufacture; learning (artificial intelligence); statistical analysis; support vector machines; SVM based attacks; information leakage measure; lightweight hardware security primitives; linear separating boundary; machine learning algorithm; modeling attack resistance; nonlinear current mirror; physically unclonable function; secure PUF; statistical circuit simulation; support vector machine; unique signature generation; Delays; Integrated circuit modeling; Machine learning algorithms; Mirrors; Reliability; Security; Support vector machines; Hardware security; Modeling attacks; PUFs;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Arlington, VA
Print_ISBN
978-1-4799-4114-8
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/HST.2014.6855565
Filename
6855565
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