Truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing

Stimulating both service users and service providers is of paramount importance to mobile crowdsourcing. A few incentive mechanisms have been proposed, but all of them have focused only on one-sided interactions either among service users or among service providers. For the first time, to the best of our knowledge, we investigate the important two-sided online interactions among service users and service providers in mobile crowdsourcing. We model such interactions as online double auctions, explicitly taking the dynamic nature of both users and providers into account We propose a general framework for the design of truthful online double auctions for dynamic mobile crowdsourcing. The framework is expressive and can work with different price schedules. We propose price-ranked online double auctions with four price schedules to implement the framework, which are suitable for different scenarios. With theoretical analysis and extensive simulations we demonstrate that the proposed auctions are strategy-proof, individual rational, and ensure budget balance.