• DocumentCode
    1818006
  • Title

    Side-channel issues for designing secure hardware implementations

  • Author

    Batina, Lejla ; Mentens, Nele ; Verbauwhede, Ingrid

  • Author_Institution
    Katholieke Univ. Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
  • fYear
    2005
  • fDate
    6-8 July 2005
  • Firstpage
    118
  • Lastpage
    121
  • Abstract
    Selecting a strong cryptographic algorithm makes no sense if the information leaks out of the device through side-channels. Sensitive information, such as secret keys, can be obtained by observing the power consumption, the electromagnetic radiation, etc. This class of attacks is called side-channel attacks. Another type of attacks, namely fault attacks, reveal secret information by inserting faults into the device. Because both side-channel attacks and fault attacks are based on weaknesses in the implementation, they both belong to the category of implementation attacks. This work gives an overview of the state-of-the-art in implementation attacks, reviews the origin of this problem at the CMOS circuit level and discusses countermeasures.
  • Keywords
    CMOS digital integrated circuits; cryptography; integrated circuit design; CMOS circuit; cryptographic algorithm; fault attacks; implementation attacks; information leakage; secret information; secret keys; secure hardware implementations; side-channel attacks; Circuit faults; Cryptography; Data mining; Electromagnetic radiation; Energy consumption; Hardware; Inverters; Power measurement; Security; Timing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    On-Line Testing Symposium, 2005. IOLTS 2005. 11th IEEE International
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-2406-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/IOLTS.2005.64
  • Filename
    1498144