DocumentCode :
1818006
Title :
Side-channel issues for designing secure hardware implementations
Author :
Batina, Lejla ; Mentens, Nele ; Verbauwhede, Ingrid
Author_Institution :
Katholieke Univ. Leuven, Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
fYear :
2005
fDate :
6-8 July 2005
Firstpage :
118
Lastpage :
121
Abstract :
Selecting a strong cryptographic algorithm makes no sense if the information leaks out of the device through side-channels. Sensitive information, such as secret keys, can be obtained by observing the power consumption, the electromagnetic radiation, etc. This class of attacks is called side-channel attacks. Another type of attacks, namely fault attacks, reveal secret information by inserting faults into the device. Because both side-channel attacks and fault attacks are based on weaknesses in the implementation, they both belong to the category of implementation attacks. This work gives an overview of the state-of-the-art in implementation attacks, reviews the origin of this problem at the CMOS circuit level and discusses countermeasures.
Keywords :
CMOS digital integrated circuits; cryptography; integrated circuit design; CMOS circuit; cryptographic algorithm; fault attacks; implementation attacks; information leakage; secret information; secret keys; secure hardware implementations; side-channel attacks; Circuit faults; Cryptography; Data mining; Electromagnetic radiation; Energy consumption; Hardware; Inverters; Power measurement; Security; Timing;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
On-Line Testing Symposium, 2005. IOLTS 2005. 11th IEEE International
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-2406-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/IOLTS.2005.64
Filename :
1498144
Link To Document :
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