DocumentCode :
182040
Title :
A distributed infrastructure to analyse SIP attacks in the Internet
Author :
Aziz, Ahmedullah ; Hoffstadt, Dirk ; Rathgeb, Erwin ; Dreibholz, T.
Author_Institution :
Inst. for Exp. Math., Univ. of Duisburg-Essen, Essen, Germany
fYear :
2014
fDate :
2-4 June 2014
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
9
Abstract :
VoIP systems, based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), are becoming more and more widespread in the Internet. However, this creates security issues and opens up new opportunities for misuse and fraud. The most widespread threat are multi-stage attacks to commit Toll Fraud. To devise effective countermeasures, it is crucial to know how attacks on these systems are performed in reality. In this paper, we introduce a novel distributed monitoring system with Sensor nodes located in Norway, Germany and China that allow to detect SIP-based attacks from the Internet. Based on experiences from experiments spanning several years, we propose a new setup which allows simple and straightforward addition of new remote observation points. We have deployed this setup in the NorNet testbed and highlight its advantages compared to a previous setup with physically distributed Sensors. We also present results from a 45 day field test with 13 observation points. These results confirm the advantages of a widely distributed monitoring setup and give some new insights into the behavior of the attackers.
Keywords :
Internet telephony; security of data; signalling protocols; China; Germany; Internet; Norway; SIP-based attacks; Session Initiation Protocol; VoIP system; distributed infrastructure; distributed monitoring system; sensor nodes; Internet; Monitoring; Registers; Security; Servers; Software; Standards; Honeynet; Honeypot; Nornet; SIP; STR; Sensor; Toll Fraud; VoIP; fraud; misuse; misuse detection; security;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Networking Conference, 2014 IFIP
Conference_Location :
Trondheim
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/IFIPNetworking.2014.6857088
Filename :
6857088
Link To Document :
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