A Complexity Based Forensic Analysis of the Trojan Horse Defence

Author

Overill, Richard E. ; Silomon, Jantje A M

Author_Institution

Dept. of Inf., King´´s Coll. London, London, UK

fYear

2011

fDate

22-26 Aug. 2011

Firstpage

764

Lastpage

768

Abstract

The Operational Complexity Model (OCM) has been used to derive the complexities of the five most prevalent cyber-crimes occurring in southeast Asia, namely peer-to-peer (P2P) multimedia piracy, online auction fraud, online storage of offensive material, theft of online game weapons, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. In each case the complexity of the simplest Trojan horse process that might be invoked as an alternative explanation for the recovered digital evidence is also determined using the OCM, and the results are used to assess the relative plausibility of the two competing explanations in each case. Finally, the forensically determined circumstances under which a Trojan horse defence is most likely to be successful are outlined.

Keywords

computational complexity; invasive software; Trojan horse defence; complexity based forensic analysis; cybercrime; digital evidence; distributed denial-of-service attack; online auction fraud; online game weapon theft; online offensive material storage; operational complexity model; peer-to-peer multimedia piracy; Complexity theory; Computers; Forensics; Games; IP networks; Trojan horses; Weapons; Trojan horse defence; alternative hypotheses; digital forensics; operational complexity model; posterior odds; relative plausibility metrics;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), 2011 Sixth International Conference on

Conference_Location

Vienna

Print_ISBN

978-1-4577-0979-1

Electronic_ISBN

978-0-7695-4485-4

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ARES.2011.120

Filename

6046034