DocumentCode :
1840885
Title :
How to tolerate half less one Byzantine nodes in practical distributed systems
Author :
Correia, Miguel ; Neves, Nuno Ferreira ; Veríssimo, Paulo
Author_Institution :
Faculdade de Ciencias, Lisboa Univ., Portugal
fYear :
2004
fDate :
18-20 Oct. 2004
Firstpage :
174
Lastpage :
183
Abstract :
The application of dependability concepts and techniques to the design of secure distributed systems is raising a considerable amount of interest in both communities under the designation of intrusion tolerance. However, practical intrusion-tolerant replicated systems based on the state machine approach (SMA) can handle at most f Byzantine components out of a total of n = 3f + 1, which is the maximum resilience in asynchronous systems. This paper extends the normal asynchronous system with a special distributed oracle called TTCB. Using this extended system we manage to implement an intrusion-tolerant service based on the SMA with only 2f + 1 replicas. Albeit a few other papers in the literature present intrusion-tolerant services with this approach, this is the first time the number of replicas is reduced from 3f + 1 to 2f + 1. Another interesting characteristic of the described service is a low time complexity.
Keywords :
distributed processing; fault tolerant computing; security of data; Byzantine components; Byzantine nodes; TTCB; asynchronous systems; distributed oracle; intrusion tolerance; intrusion-tolerant replicated system; intrusion-tolerant service; low time complexity; maximum resilience; secure distributed systems; state machine approach; Context; Context-aware services; Fault tolerance; Informatics; Laboratories; Large-scale systems; Protocols; Quality of service; Resilience; Security;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Reliable Distributed Systems, 2004. Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE International Symposium on
ISSN :
1060-9857
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-2239-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/RELDIS.2004.1353018
Filename :
1353018
Link To Document :
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