Title :
Technology spillover and cooperate R&D
Author :
SunXiaohua ; ZhengHui
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Econ., Dalian Univ. of Technol., Dalian, China
Abstract :
Based on expanding AJ model, the three-stage cournot game model considering horizontal and vertical technology spillovers is built. From the equilibrium solution by reverse induction, the effects on firm R&D investment from horizontal and vertical spillovers are investigated under different cooperate R&D modes. It is found that except in the case of noncooperation, firms´ R&D investment always increase with the rise of vertical spillover, and under horizontal and mixed cooperation, R&D investment increase with the rise of horizontal spillover. And then, the comparison of different cooperate R&D modes in terms of externalities shows that: when the level of technology spillovers is comparatively low, vertical cooperation can maximize R&D investment ; When the level of technology spillovers is comparatively high, mixed cooperation is the best choice for firm to increase R&D investment.
Keywords :
game theory; investment; research and development; technology management; AJ model; R&D investment; cooperate R&D; cournot game model; horizontal technology spillover; vertical technology spillover; Economics; Equations; Games; Industries; Investments; Patents; Production; cooperate R&D; cournot competition; horizontal spillover; vertical spillover;
Conference_Titel :
Business Management and Electronic Information (BMEI), 2011 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Guangzhou
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-108-3
DOI :
10.1109/ICBMEI.2011.5917893