Title :
Negotiation with incomplete information about worth: strict versus tolerant mechanisms
Author :
Zlotkin, Gilad ; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel
Abstract :
In the domain of distributed AI (DAI), two negotiation mechanisms (one strict and one tolerant), and a negotiation strategy, for the situation where agents´ goals are common knowledge, but the worths they attach to those goals are private are presented. All possible prototypical classes of (non-conflict) encounters are analyzed, and it is shown where the strategy and mechanisms result in stable and/or efficient solutions. In most cases, the negotiation strategy is both stable and efficient. These are two situations in which the strategy, in combination with both mechanisms, results in a conflict (a non-efficient result). The reason for this inefficiency may be the failure to include conflict-resolution techniques. It is conjectured that enhancing the mechanisms with such techniques would result in a stable and efficient outcome in those two situations as well
Keywords :
cooperative systems; uncertainty handling; DAI; conflict-resolution techniques; distributed AI; incomplete information; negotiation mechanisms; worth; Artificial intelligence; Computer science; Costs; Protocols;
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent and Cooperative Information Systems, 1993., Proceedings of International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Rotterdam
Print_ISBN :
0-8186-3135-X
DOI :
10.1109/ICICIS.1993.291749