DocumentCode :
1862608
Title :
On the Moral Risk of the Franchised Enterprise in the Operation of Highway The Traffic Administrative Department on Behalf of Public Interest
Author :
Peng, Sheng-ting ; Peng, Xing-ting
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Politics & Law, Jiangxi Normal Univ., Nanchang, China
fYear :
2010
fDate :
22-24 Jan. 2010
Firstpage :
595
Lastpage :
598
Abstract :
Assuming that the traffic administrative department is on behalf of public interest, a model of game theory was established to illustrate the moral risk of the franchised enterprise in the operation of highway. This paper thought that to bring the franchised enterprise under regulation and to improve the supply efficiency of highway, we must make efforts from the following three aspects. First, increase punishment appropriately. Second, increase awards from the government. Third, support and help the franchised enterprise to reduce its daily operating cost.
Keywords :
cost reduction; game theory; government; public utilities; risk management; road traffic; awards; daily operating cost reduction; franchised enterprise; game theory; government; highway operation; moral risk; public interest; punishment; traffic administrative department; Costs; Electronic learning; Electronic mail; Ethics; Game theory; Government; Monopoly; Privatization; Road transportation; Traffic control; Franchised Enterprise; Game Theory; Highway; Moral Risk; Regulation;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
e-Education, e-Business, e-Management, and e-Learning, 2010. IC4E '10. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Sanya
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5680-2
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5681-9
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/IC4E.2010.43
Filename :
5432579
Link To Document :
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