DocumentCode :
187372
Title :
The Definition and Assessment of a Safety Argument
Author :
Cassano, V. ; Maibaum, T.S.E.
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. & Software, McMaster Univ., Hamilton, ON, Canada
fYear :
2014
fDate :
3-6 Nov. 2014
Firstpage :
180
Lastpage :
185
Abstract :
That safety cases are gaining prominence in safety regimes and regulations is a claim that, nowadays, may go more or less unchallenged. In brief, a safety case intends to make an explicit and compelling case that a system under consideration is safe for its intended use. When understood in this sense, the notion of a safety argument becomes one of the key elements of a properly formulated safety case. Herein, in what may be seen as work in progress, we comment on some preliminary thoughts regarding the challenges one must face in order to provide an adequate and sensible definition of what would count as being a safety argument. We contend that, without such a definition, the assessment of a safety argument is well-nigh impossible.
Keywords :
safety-critical software; safety argument; safety cases; safety regimes; safety regulation; Calculus; Cognition; Educational institutions; Hazards; Materials; Production; Logical System; Safety Argument; Safety Argument Evaluation; Safety Case;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Software Reliability Engineering Workshops (ISSREW), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Naples
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISSREW.2014.55
Filename :
6983835
Link To Document :
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