• DocumentCode
    1885176
  • Title

    A model for secure protocols and their compositions

  • Author

    Heintze, Nevin ; Tygar, J.D.

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput. Sci., Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA, USA
  • fYear
    1994
  • fDate
    16-18 May 1994
  • Firstpage
    2
  • Lastpage
    13
  • Abstract
    We give a formal model of protocol security. The model allows us to reason about the security of protocol, and considers issues of beliefs of agents, time, and secrecy. We prove a composition theorem which allows us to state sufficient conditions on two secure protocols A and B such that they may be combined to form a new secure protocol C. Moreover, we give counter-examples to show that when the conditions are not met, the protocol C may not be secure
  • Keywords
    formal verification; protocols; security of data; agent beliefs; composition theorem; formal model; protocol security; secrecy; secure protocols; sufficient conditions; Computer science; Concatenated codes; Concrete; Contracts; Electrostatic discharge; Postal services; Protocols; Security; Sufficient conditions;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Research in Security and Privacy, 1994. Proceedings., 1994 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Oakland, CA
  • Print_ISBN
    0-8186-5675-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/RISP.1994.296596
  • Filename
    296596