DocumentCode :
188564
Title :
Game theoretic approach to offering participation incentives for electric vehicle-to-vehicle charge sharing
Author :
Dutta, Promiti ; Boulanger, Albert
Author_Institution :
Columbia Univ., New York, NY, USA
fYear :
2014
fDate :
15-18 June 2014
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
Electric vehicles are not penetrating the market as quickly as expected. This is due to limited driving range, time required to recharge a battery, and lack of charging infrastructure in most metropolitan cities. We propose a charge sharing network in which we use inductive power transfer to wirelessly exchange charge between vehicles. In our network, vehicles that have excess charge to share, can sell charge to vehicles needing charge to reach their destination. In this paper, we describe a game theoretic approach to offering incentives for electric vehicles to participate in the charge sharing network. We utilize Nash Bargaining theory to show that participation in the network can yield profits for the seller driving to their destination and that we can increase the number of cars reaching their destination without needing to stop for recharging.
Keywords :
automobiles; battery powered vehicles; game theory; incentive schemes; inductive power transmission; secondary cells; Nash Bargaining theory; car battery recharging; charge wireless exchange; charging infrastructure; electric vehicle-to-vehicle charge sharing network; game theoretic approach; inductive power transfer; metropolitan cities; participation incentives; power market; Batteries; Charge transfer; Electric vehicles; Equations; Logistics; Mathematical model; Electric vehicles; Nash Bargaining; cooperation; game theory; inductive power transfer;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Transportation Electrification Conference and Expo (ITEC), 2014 IEEE
Conference_Location :
Dearborn, MI
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ITEC.2014.6861834
Filename :
6861834
Link To Document :
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