Title :
Supply Chain Contract Designing with Moral Hazard Based on Screening Model
Author :
Ma, Weimin ; Li, Chao
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Tongji Univ., Shanghai, China
Abstract :
Supply chain moral hazard caused by risk aversion is analyzed in the paper. Based on the screening model and some results derived in previous literatures, an incentive menu of contracts is reconstructed. One of the two main parameters that construct the menu has been redesigned and the properties of the new parameter, namely, the unit payoff coefficient are analyzed in detail.
Keywords :
contracts; design; risk management; social sciences; supply chains; moral hazard; risk aversion; screening model; supply chain contract design; unit payoff coefficient; Chaos; Conference management; Contracts; Design automation; Ethics; Hazards; Paper technology; Risk management; Supply chain management; Supply chains; incentive contract; moral hazard; screening model; supply chain;
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation, 2009. ICICTA '09. Second International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Changsha, Hunan
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3804-4
DOI :
10.1109/ICICTA.2009.706
