Routing Protocol Security Using Symmetric Key Based Techniques

In this paper, we address the security of routing protocols. Internet routing protocols are subject to attacks in the control plane as well as the data plane. In the control plane, a routing protocol, e.g., BGP, OSPF, exchanges routing state updates and enables routers to compute the best paths towards various destinations. During this phase, an attacker can modify or inject malicious control messages leading to incorrect computation of routing paths. In the data plane, the routers forward the data along the paths computed in the control plane. Even if an attacker is not successful during the control phase, he can choose not to use the correct routing paths and forward data along routes that benefit him. Research shows that, attacks on the control plane can be mitigated by ensuring message integrity and, attacks on the data plane can be mitigated by ensuring route integrity. Earlier works have addressed these two problems independently with many interesting solutions. However, due to the nature of these solutions, network architects cannot deploy security at both planes without increasing the overhead on the network. In this paper, we focus on an integrated approach and propose the use of symmetric key protocols for addressing the security at both the control and data planes. We describe approaches that enable the reuse of the symmetric key protocols thereby eliminating the need for separate solutions at different planes. We used symmetric key protocols as they are efficient and scalable. Our experimental results show that our approaches are practical and can be incrementally deployed as well.