Dynamic Game Analysis on Knowledge-Sharing and Knowledge-Spillover in Competitive Alliances

A conceptual model of the knowledge-sharing and the knowledge-spillover was constructed according to the knowledge voluntary proliferation and the non-voluntary proliferation characteristics between the individual members in the competitive alliance, and a three-stage gambling model based on the cost decreasing effect of the knowledge-sharing and the knowledge-spillover was established. This paper discusses the sharing of mutually-complementary knowledge resources across organizations in the competitive strategic alliance as well as the conditions of maintaining their cooperation. The result indicates that, under the Nash balanced condition, the knowledge sharing level increases along with the expansion of the sharing cost effect. The optimum knowledge sharing coefficient is in directly proportional to the structure of the marginal cost of the whole alliances and every alliance member; it is inversely proportional to the every alliance memberpsilas absorption coefficient on knowledge shared; it is in inversely proportional to the investment cost paid by every alliance member on acquire knowledge.