• DocumentCode
    1973327
  • Title

    Dependence of optimal monitoring strategy on the application to be protected

  • Author

    Garnaev, Andrey ; Trappe, Wade ; Chun-Ta Kung

  • Author_Institution
    St. Petersburg State Univ., St. Petersburg, Russia
  • fYear
    2012
  • fDate
    3-7 Dec. 2012
  • Firstpage
    1054
  • Lastpage
    1059
  • Abstract
    Dynamic spectrum access is a powerful approach to taking advantage of opportunities in spectrum to communicate. Access to these spectral opportunities should be regulated and monitored to prevent unapproved theft of spectral resources, which ultimately belong to a primary user. Unfortunately, most of the literature devoted to spectrum scanning does not consider the over-arching application that a spectrum thief might try to run. In this paper, we show that the thief´s application (specifically, its QoS requirements), plays a critical role in how the thief should attempt to sneak spectrum and, consequently, a critical role in how the spectrum monitoring infrastructure should scan spectrum to detect thievery of spectral resources. We study the difference in the thief´s behavior when considering bandwidth and delay as the two primary QoS parameters he is concerned with. Loosely speaking, this corresponds to sneaking for file-download versus streaming video, and the ultimate lesson learned is that the detection probability of unlicensed access to spectrum resources depends on the application type. As a consequence, knowledge of the application type allows for the primary user to improve spectrum scanning. Given the juxtaposition between the thief´s and scanner´s objectives, and the underlying dependency between detection and application QoS requirements, we finally formulate an adversarial Bayesian game where the scanner´s scanning takes into account statistical knowledge about applications used by the user. The equilibrium strategies of this game are found in closed form what allowed to find their interesting properties. In particular, it was shown that the equilibrium sneaking strategies for different types of user are bandwidth-sharing, and we demonstrate how information about the application the user prefers to sneak at can improve the monitoring strategy.
  • Keywords
    Bayes methods; bandwidth allocation; game theory; quality of service; radio spectrum management; Bayesian game; QoS parameter; QoS requirement; bandwidth sharing; delay; detection probability; dynamic spectrum access; equilibrium sneaking strategy; file download; optimal monitoring strategy; primary user; spectral opportunities; spectral resource; spectrum monitoring infrastructure; spectrum resource; spectrum scanning; spectrum thief; statistical knowledge; thief behavior; unlicensed access; video streaming;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), 2012 IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Anaheim, CA
  • ISSN
    1930-529X
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-0920-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    1930-529X
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/GLOCOM.2012.6503252
  • Filename
    6503252