• DocumentCode
    1977600
  • Title

    Detecting heap smashing attacks through fault containment wrappers

  • Author

    Fetzer, Christof ; Xiao, Zhen

  • Author_Institution
    AT&T Labs. Res., Florham Park, NJ, USA
  • fYear
    2001
  • fDate
    2001
  • Firstpage
    80
  • Lastpage
    89
  • Abstract
    Buffer overflow attacks are a major cause of security breaches in modern operating systems. Not only are overflows of buffers on the stack a security threat, overflows of buffers kept on the heap can be too. A malicious user might be able to hijack the control flow of a root-privileged program if the user can initiate an overflow of a buffer on the heap when this overflow overwrites a function pointer stored on the heap. The paper presents a fault-containment wrapper which provides effective and efficient protection against heap buffer overflows caused by C library functions. The wrapper intercepts every function call to the C library that can write to the heap and performs careful boundary checks before it calls the original function. This method is transparent to existing programs and does not require source code modification or recompilation. Experimental results on Linux machines indicate that the performance overhead is small
  • Keywords
    C language; buffer storage; computer crime; operating systems (computers); program diagnostics; software libraries; C library functions; Linux machines; boundary checks; buffer overflow attacks; control flow; fault containment wrappers; fault-containment wrapper; function call; function pointer; heap buffer overflows; heap smashing attack detection; malicious user; modern operating systems; performance overhead; root-privileged program; security breaches; security threat; Buffer overflow; Buffer storage; Debugging; Fault detection; Fault tolerant systems; Libraries; Linux; Operating systems; Protection; Security;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Reliable Distributed Systems, 2001. Proceedings. 20th IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    New Orleans, LA
  • ISSN
    1060-9857
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-1366-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/RELDIS.2001.969756
  • Filename
    969756