DocumentCode
1989439
Title
Using logics to detect implementation-dependent flaws [cryptographic protocol design]
Author
Carlsen, Ulf
Author_Institution
Ecole Nat. Superieure des Telecommun. de Bretagne, Cesson Sevigne, France
fYear
1993
fDate
6-10 Dec 1993
Firstpage
64
Lastpage
73
Abstract
Vulnerabilities may be introduced at all stages of cryptographic protocol design. Reasoning about a protocol at a functional level does not unveil flaws which are inherently implementation-dependent. This paper uncovers a potential implementation-dependent flaw in a previously published protocol. Formal techniques should be able to analyse protocols with respect to such flaws. The epistemic logic CKT5 is modified and shown to operate at a sufficiently detailed bevel to capture implementation-dependent flaws
Keywords
cryptography; inference mechanisms; protocols; cryptographic protocol design; epistemic logic CKT5; formal techniques; implementation-dependent flaws; reasoning; Authentication; Body sensor networks; Cryptographic protocols; Cryptography; Knowledge based systems; Logic design; Niobium; Proposals;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Applications Conference, 1993. Proceedings., Ninth Annual
Conference_Location
Orlando, FL
Print_ISBN
0-8186-4330-7
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSAC.1993.315453
Filename
315453
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