Co-evolution in negotiation games

Author

Murakami, Yukikazu ; Sato, Hiroshi ; Namatame, Akira

Author_Institution

Dept. of Comput. Sci., Nat. Defense Acad., Yokosuka, Japan

fYear

2001

fDate

2001

Firstpage

241

Lastpage

245

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the mechanism of co-evolution in the negotiation situations. We formulate negotiation situations as hawk-dove games. It is an interesting question to answer how the society gropes its way towards equilibrium in an imperfect world when self-interested agents learn each other in order to improve the rules of interaction. It is known the mixed strategy will result in equilibrium in hawk-dove games, and both hawks and doves coexist. In this paper, we consider evolutionary dynamics with local matching and investigate the role of the mutual learning. We show that all agents gradually learn to behave as doves, which result in social efficiency

Keywords

evolutionary computation; game theory; learning (artificial intelligence); software agents; agents; co-evolution; equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; hawk-dove games; local matching; mixed strategy; self-interested agents; social efficiency; Computer science; Displays; Frequency; Game theory; Genetic mutations; Injuries; Lattices;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Computational Intelligence and Multimedia Applications, 2001. ICCIMA 2001. Proceedings. Fourth International Conference on

Conference_Location

Yokusika City

Print_ISBN

0-7695-1312-3

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICCIMA.2001.970473

Filename

970473