• DocumentCode
    2015272
  • Title

    Mitigating Resource-Draining DoS Attacks on Broadcast Source Authentication on Wireless Sensors Networks

  • Author

    Bekara, Chakib ; Laurent-maknavicius, Maryline ; Bekara, Kheira

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. TELECOM, TELECOM & MANEGEMENT Sud-Paris, Evry, France
  • fYear
    2008
  • fDate
    13-15 Dec. 2008
  • Firstpage
    109
  • Lastpage
    116
  • Abstract
    During the few last years, several broadcast source authentication protocols (BSAPs) were proposed for wireless sensors network (WSN), to secure broadcast communications. Amongst the proposed protocols, we find time-asymmetry based BSAPs, that achieve delayed authentication of broadcasted data, and are known for their low computation and transmission overheads. However, time-asymmetry based BSAPs suffer from a kind of DoS attacks, called resource-draining DoS attack, in which an attacker floods the network with fake messages, that all sensors of the network buffer and forward, then later verify, thus causing buffer overflow and batteries depletion. In this paper we investigate resource-draining DoS attack in time-asymmetry based BSAPs, and propose a new time asymmetry based BSAP protocol, to overcome this kind of DoS attacks, by achieving a hop-by-hop authentication of broadcasted messages, thus limiting the damage of an attacker to its one-hop neighbors only, instead of the entire network.
  • Keywords
    wireless sensor networks; DoS attack; broadcast source authentication protocols; hop-by-hop authentication; mitigating resource-draining; wireless sensors networks; Authentication; Batteries; Broadcast technology; Broadcasting; Buffer overflow; Computer crime; Delay; Protocols; Telecommunications; Wireless sensor networks; Authentication; Broadcast authentication; DoS Attack; WSN security; Wireless Sensor Network;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security Technology, 2008. SECTECH '08. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Hainan Island
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3486-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SecTech.2008.20
  • Filename
    4725356