A bayesian based incentive-compatible routing mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Access networks

In this paper, we address the problem of incentive based routing in Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) networks, where each secondary node incurs a cost for routing traffic from a flow and also has a certain capacity that it can provide to the flow. We propose a path auction based routing mechanism in which each secondary node announces its privately known cost and capacity, based on which a route is chosen and payments are made to the nodes. We design the route selection mechanism and the pricing function in a manner that can induce nodes to reveal their cost and capacity honestly, while minimizing the payment that needs to be given to the nodes that relay traffic, thereby making our path auction optimal. In our proposed mechanism, the optimal route over which traffic should be routed and the payment that each node should receive can be computed in polynomial time. Simulation results suggest that our mechanism can ensure truthful reporting of both cost and capacity while making a payment less than that required for VCG based least cost path routing.