• DocumentCode
    2020301
  • Title

    Secrecy in multiagent systems

  • Author

    Halpern, Joseph ; O´Neill, Kevin

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY, USA
  • fYear
    2002
  • fDate
    2002
  • Firstpage
    32
  • Lastpage
    46
  • Abstract
    We introduce a general framework for reasoning about secrecy requirements in multiagent systems. Because secrecy requirements are closely connected with the knowledge of individual agents of a system, our framework employs the modal logic of knowledge within the context of the well-studied runs and systems framework. Put simply, "secrets" are facts about a system that low-level agents are never allowed to know. The framework presented here allows us to formalize this intuition precisely, in a way that is much in the spirit of Sutherland\´s notion of nondeducibility. Several well-known attempts to characterize the absence of information flow, including separability, generalized noninterference, and nondeducibility on strategies, turn out to be special cases of our definition of secrecy. However, our approach lets us go well beyond these definitions. It can handle probabilistic secrecy in a clean way, and it suggests generalizations of secrecy that may be useful for dealing with resource-bounded reasoning and with issues such as downgrading of information.
  • Keywords
    multi-agent systems; security of data; low-level agents; modal logic; multiagent systems; reasoning; secrecy; secrecy requirements; Algebra; Carbon capture and storage; Computer science; Context modeling; Information security; Interleaved codes; Logic; Multiagent systems; Research initiatives; System recovery;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002. Proceedings. 15th IEEE
  • ISSN
    1063-6900
  • Print_ISBN
    0-7695-1689-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021805
  • Filename
    1021805