DocumentCode
2020301
Title
Secrecy in multiagent systems
Author
Halpern, Joseph ; O´Neill, Kevin
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Cornell Univ., Ithaca, NY, USA
fYear
2002
fDate
2002
Firstpage
32
Lastpage
46
Abstract
We introduce a general framework for reasoning about secrecy requirements in multiagent systems. Because secrecy requirements are closely connected with the knowledge of individual agents of a system, our framework employs the modal logic of knowledge within the context of the well-studied runs and systems framework. Put simply, "secrets" are facts about a system that low-level agents are never allowed to know. The framework presented here allows us to formalize this intuition precisely, in a way that is much in the spirit of Sutherland\´s notion of nondeducibility. Several well-known attempts to characterize the absence of information flow, including separability, generalized noninterference, and nondeducibility on strategies, turn out to be special cases of our definition of secrecy. However, our approach lets us go well beyond these definitions. It can handle probabilistic secrecy in a clean way, and it suggests generalizations of secrecy that may be useful for dealing with resource-bounded reasoning and with issues such as downgrading of information.
Keywords
multi-agent systems; security of data; low-level agents; modal logic; multiagent systems; reasoning; secrecy; secrecy requirements; Algebra; Carbon capture and storage; Computer science; Context modeling; Information security; Interleaved codes; Logic; Multiagent systems; Research initiatives; System recovery;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002. Proceedings. 15th IEEE
ISSN
1063-6900
Print_ISBN
0-7695-1689-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021805
Filename
1021805
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