Title :
Supply Chain Coordination for Quality Improving
Author :
Li Mingfang ; Li Guochang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Hebei Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Shijiazhuang, China
Abstract :
Retailer´s effort for quality information collection and feedback is especially serious for product quality improving. The more effort, the quicker quality improving, the less defective returns in the product life cycle. In the decentralized supply chain, there is lack of incentive for retailer to exert more effort, which leads to the failure of supply chain coordination. In this paper, we designed a transfer payment punishment contract to coordinate the supply chain in order to reduce defective returns, which committed to transfer retailer a payment at the product´ market entry stage for effort cost compensation, and charges penalty for each defective return at the end of product life cycle, the punishment will been deducted from the committed transfer payment. This contract provides an incentive to the retailer to increase his effort, thus decreasing the number of defective returns in the product life cycle. We show that this contract can achieve channel coordination and a win-win outcome for both manufacture and retailer.
Keywords :
product liability; product life cycle management; quality management; retailing; supply chain management; cost compensation; decentralized supply chain; defective return reduction; product life cycle; product quality improvement; quality information collection; quality information feedback; retailing; supply chain coordination; transfer payment punishment contract; Cities and towns; Control systems; Current measurement; Electrical equipment industry; Game theory; Government; Industrial control; Investments; Supply chains;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4639-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5300942