Compromise reaching mechanisms in multi-group/multi-player negotiation processes

We consider a situation in which multiple decision-makers who are partitioned into two or more distinct groups are asked to recommend a uniform course of action which is drawn from a finite and explicit set of potential alternatives. We present group-level and player-level mechanisms to reach a compromise decision under such circumstances. The group-level mechanism is based on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, whereas the player-level mechanism employs a set-product operation that aggregates the individual decisions over a certain space of committees. Previous research established that the two mechanisms are isomorphic, which, in the context addressed, implies that they yield the same compromise decision. However, unlike the Dempster-Shafer theory, which was criticized for lack of external validity, the set-product mechanism has plausible properties in the context of group decision making. With that in mind, the authors seek to: report about an interesting relationship between group decision research and AI methods to manage uncertainty; and build a foundation for an inter-disciplinary research that exploits this linkage.<>