Sequence sensing Jamming attacks against modular-based channel hopping rendezvous algorithms for cognitive ratio networks

Efficient utilization of wireless bandwidth is a critical, if not the key, component of the wireless network architectures that balance availability and access. Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) are an important part of the solution to this problem. Common control channels (CCCs) for rendezvous in CRNs have limitations such as single point of failure, low scalability, and susceptibility to jamming attacks. Several rendezvous algorithms have recently been proposed that remove the need for CCCs. In particular, the Modular Clock (MC) channel hopping rendezvous algorithms provide extremely efficient rendezvous times for CRNs without using time synchronization and CCCs (i.e., blind rendezvous). However, these algorithms are vulnerable to Sequence Sensing Jamming Attacks (SSJAs) in which the jammer can estimate the channel hopping sequences within the first-half period of the MC algorithm. Using a single jammer and two listening channels, we show how to compute the entire MC Channel Hopping (CH) sequence and thus reduce the rendezvous success rate from around 95% to around 15% for the basic period. We show this is a major security problem for CRNs utilizing the MC algorithm since any secondary user or even group of users can easily be denied access to the network with high probability. We also compare these results to the Random rendezvous algorithm and show it vastly outperforms the MC algorithm when there are security concerns about a sequence sensing jammer.