DocumentCode :
2079782
Title :
Contract-Based Trilateral Game Research of Private License or Transferring Behavior During the Operating of Patent Pool
Author :
Liu Jieming ; Wu Qian ; Huang Qing
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Arts & Law, Wuhan Univ. of Technol., Wuhan, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
20-22 Sept. 2009
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
In this article trilateral game model which is based on contract during the operating of patent pool is established. The three parties in the game model are the internal members of patent pool, patent demand persons and management organization of patent pool. Based on the basic models, three types of specific situations are been further discussed and each ones are be solved and concretely analyzed. The ultimate conclusion is that the management organization of patent pool can reduce or prevent the private license or transferring behavior which occur between the internal members of patent pool and patent demand persons by five methods, which are reducing cost of supervision and inspection, improving quality of supervision and inspection, dealing with the punishment more severely, enlarging both losses of image and reputation and increasing propaganda ram which make those people fully understand the negative influence of the private license or transferring behavior.
Keywords :
contracts; economics; game theory; patents; contract-based trilateral game model; patent pool; private license; Art; Contracts; Costs; Environmental economics; Inspection; Licenses; Monopoly; Quality management; Technological innovation; Technology management;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4639-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5301287
Filename :
5301287
Link To Document :
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