Title :
Admission control mechanisms for continuous queries in the cloud
Author :
Al Moakar, Lory ; Chrysanthis, Panos K. ; Chung, Christine ; Guirguis, Shenoda ; Labrinidis, Alexandros ; Neophytou, Panayiotis ; Pruhs, Kirk
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Abstract :
Amazon, Google, and IBM now sell cloud computing services.We consider the setting of a for-profit business selling data stream monitoring/management services and we investigate auction-based mechanisms for admission control of continuous queries. When submitting a query, each user also submits a bid of how much she is willing to pay for that query to run. The admission control auction mechanism then determines which queries to admit, and how much to charge each user in a way that maximizes system revenue while being strategyproof and sybil immune, incentivizing users to use the system honestly. Specifically, we require that each user maximizes her payoff by bidding her true value of having her query run. We design several payment mechanisms and experimentally evaluate them. We describe the provable game theoretic characteristics of each mechanism alongside its performance with respect to maximizing profit and total user payoff.
Keywords :
Web services; electronic commerce; game theory; query processing; admission control mechanisms; auction-based mechanisms; cloud computing services; continuous queries; data stream management services; data stream monitoring services; for-profit business; profit maximization; provable game theoretic characteristics; total user payoff; Admission control; Business; Cloud computing; Computer science; Computerized monitoring; Cost accounting; Educational institutions; Game theory; Kirk field collapse effect; Streaming media;
Conference_Titel :
Data Engineering (ICDE), 2010 IEEE 26th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Long Beach, CA
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5445-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-5444-0
DOI :
10.1109/ICDE.2010.5447822
