Title :
Fang: a firewall analysis engine
Author :
Mayer, Alain ; Wool, Avishai ; Ziskind, Elisha
Author_Institution :
Lucent Technols., Bell Labs., Muray Hill, NJ, USA
Abstract :
Today, even a moderately sized corporate intranet contains multiple firewalls and routers, which are all used to enforce various aspects of the global corporate security policy. Configuring these devices to work in unison is difficult, especially if they are made by different vendors. Even testing or reverse engineering an existing configuration (say when a new security administrator takes over) is hard. Firewall configuration files are written in low level formalisms, whose readability is comparable to assembly code, and the global policy is spread over all the firewalls that are involved. To alleviate some of these difficulties, we designed and implemented a novel firewall analysis tool. Our software allows the administrator to easily discover and test the global firewall policy (either a deployed policy or a planned one). Our tool uses a minimal description of the network topology and directly parses the various vendor-specific low level configuration files. It interacts with the user through a query-and-answer session, which is conducted at a much higher level of abstruction. A typical question our tool can answer is “from which machines can our DMZ be reached and with which services?” Thus, the tool complements existing vulnerability analysis tools, as it can be used before a policy is actually deployed it operates on a more understandable level of abstraction, and it deals with all the firewalls at once
Keywords :
configuration management; intranets; security of data; DMZ; Fang; assembly code; corporate intranet security; deployed policy; firewall analysis engine; firewall analysis software; firewall analysis tool; firewall configuration files; global corporate security policy; global firewall policy; global policy; low level formalisms; minimal description; network topology; query-and-answer session; reverse engineering; security administrator; vendor-specific low level configuration files; vulnerability analysis tools; Appropriate technology; Assembly; Engines; Filtering; Inspection; Postal services; Security; Technology management; Testing; Wool;
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy, 2000. S&P 2000. Proceedings. 2000 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Berkeley, CA
Print_ISBN :
0-7695-0665-8
DOI :
10.1109/SECPRI.2000.848455