Title :
Permit Allocation Options: Auctioning or Grandfathering
Author :
Yang, Ruigui ; Wang, Pingping
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Art, Jiangxi Univ. of Finance & Econ., Nanchang, China
Abstract :
In discussions about the policy design of domestic emission trading, e.g., when implementing the Kyoto Protocol, the two permit allocation alternatives-auctioning and allocation gratis (grandfathering) - are often pitted against each other as representing Utopian cost-effectiveness and political realism, respectively. In this note, an attempt is made to extract the main points of a comparison between the two options with respect to efficiency and distribution.
Keywords :
power markets; allocation gratis; auctioning; domestic emission trading; grandfathering; permit allocation options; Art; Cost function; Environmental economics; Finance; Global warming; Information technology; Pollution; Protocols; Regulators; Resource management;
Conference_Titel :
Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), 2010 Asia-Pacific
Conference_Location :
Chengdu
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4812-8
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4813-5
DOI :
10.1109/APPEEC.2010.5448536
