• DocumentCode
    2104972
  • Title

    Optimal Pricing Mechanism for Generators and Large Consumers Considering Power Transmission Cost

  • Author

    Fang, Debin ; Wu, Jingfang

  • Author_Institution
    Econ. & Manage. Sch., Wuhan Univ., Wuhan, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    28-31 March 2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    The pricing mechanism in a deregulated electricity market is a key issue to achieve complete electricity market and high market efficiency. With development of electricity market, large consumers may purchase electric power from generators. In this paper, we introduce McAfee´s second-price sealed auction mechanism into multi-unit electric power transaction between generators and large consumers. A model to form electric power price between generators and large consumers considering the transaction cost and power transmission cost in a poolco-type electricity market is presented. After describing pricing rules in the deregulated power market, clearing rules and transaction rules are given, in which clearing rules can increase the probability that generators providing a large number of supply and large consumers with high demand win the auction, transaction rules can optimize the whole transmission cost and transaction cost under market equilibrium. A numerical example with eight generators and eight large consumers serves to illustrate the essential features of the method.
  • Keywords
    power markets; power transmission; pricing; McAfee second-price sealed auction mechanism; deregulated electricity market; electric power price; multi-unit electric power transaction; optimal pricing mechanism; power transmission cost; Cost function; Electricity supply industry; Energy consumption; Power generation; Power generation economics; Power markets; Power system economics; Power systems; Power transmission; Pricing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC), 2010 Asia-Pacific
  • Conference_Location
    Chengdu
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4812-8
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4813-5
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/APPEEC.2010.5448897
  • Filename
    5448897