Title :
The Research on Optimal Contract Design in the Quality Management of Reverse Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Finance, Shandong Economic Univ., Jinan
Abstract :
This paper focuses on moral hazard problems of reverse supply chain in which the manufacturer and the take-backer may take unobserved action. In order to motivate the take-backer and the manufacturer´s actions, we analyze how to specify conditions on contract parameters, the goal is to maximize the profits both each node enterprise and reverse supply chain.
Keywords :
profitability; quality management; reverse logistics; supply chain management; asymmetric information; node enterprise; optimal contract design; profit maximization; quality management; reverse supply chain; Contracts; Ethics; Finance; Hazards; Information technology; Manufacturing processes; Pulp manufacturing; Quality management; Supply chain management; Supply chains; principal-agent relationship; quality management; reverse supply chain;
Conference_Titel :
Intelligent Information Technology Application Workshops, 2008. IITAW '08. International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3505-0
DOI :
10.1109/IITA.Workshops.2008.69
