DocumentCode
2107862
Title
The Research on Optimal Contract Design in the Quality Management of Reverse Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information
Author
Liang, Shen
Author_Institution
Sch. of Finance, Shandong Economic Univ., Jinan
fYear
2008
fDate
21-22 Dec. 2008
Firstpage
877
Lastpage
880
Abstract
This paper focuses on moral hazard problems of reverse supply chain in which the manufacturer and the take-backer may take unobserved action. In order to motivate the take-backer and the manufacturer´s actions, we analyze how to specify conditions on contract parameters, the goal is to maximize the profits both each node enterprise and reverse supply chain.
Keywords
profitability; quality management; reverse logistics; supply chain management; asymmetric information; node enterprise; optimal contract design; profit maximization; quality management; reverse supply chain; Contracts; Ethics; Finance; Hazards; Information technology; Manufacturing processes; Pulp manufacturing; Quality management; Supply chain management; Supply chains; principal-agent relationship; quality management; reverse supply chain;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Intelligent Information Technology Application Workshops, 2008. IITAW '08. International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Shanghai
Print_ISBN
978-0-7695-3505-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IITA.Workshops.2008.69
Filename
4732077
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