Title :
Incentive Compatible Mechanism in P2P Systems
Author :
Wang Qingjie ; Yu, Jian ; Yu, Mei ; Zhang Jie ; Zhao Zheng
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Technol., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
Abstract :
Free-riding is that nodes only consume the resources of the contribution by other nodes, instead of sharing their resources. The problem of free-riding in P2P network is serious. Free-riding behaviors seriously limit the advantage of P2P. In this paper, the model based on the micropayment platform with an incentive mechanism is presented. Through packaging, pricing and clearing mechanisms in the model, the equal services between nodes can be achieved. Experiments show that the model can effectively solve the problem of free-riding.
Keywords :
game theory; peer-to-peer computing; P2P system; clearing mechanism; free-riding behavior; incentive compatible mechanism; micropayment platform; packaging mechanism; pricing mechanism; Algorithm design and analysis; Computer networks; Computer science; Distributed computing; Feedback; Game theory; Packaging; Peer to peer computing; Pricing; Time measurement;
Conference_Titel :
Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2009. WiCom '09. 5th International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-3692-7
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-3693-4
DOI :
10.1109/WICOM.2009.5302338