Title :
On degenerate and non-degenerate correspondences of differential games with a feedback Nash equilibrium
Author :
Yeung, David W K
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Finance, Hong Kong Univ., Hong Kong
Abstract :
In differential games, open-loop Nash equilibrium and feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE) are, in general, different. Only in the case of a degenerate FNE do these equilibria coincide. So far, only a countable number of games with a degenerate FNE or a non-degenerate FNE have been found. In this paper, the author shows that (i) a class of games with a degenerate FNE can be constructed from every game which has a non-degenerate FNE, and (ii) a class of games with a non-degenerate FNE can be constructed from every game which has a degenerate FNE. Hence,for any differential game with a degenerate (non-degenerate) FNE, there is a corresponding class of games which have a non-degenerate (degenerate) FNE
Keywords :
differential equations; feedback; game theory; degenerate correspondences; differential games; feedback Nash equilibrium; nondegenerate correspondences; open-loop Nash equilibrium; Computational Intelligence Society; Equations; Feedback; Finance; Nash equilibrium;
Conference_Titel :
Decision and Control, 1993., Proceedings of the 32nd IEEE Conference on
Conference_Location :
San Antonio, TX
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-1298-8
DOI :
10.1109/CDC.1993.325836