DocumentCode :
2118315
Title :
Credit Soft Budget Constraint and the Goal Difference
Author :
Lei Han-yun ; Wang, Shihua
Author_Institution :
Finance Sch., Xinjiang Univ. of Finance & Econ., Urumqi, China
fYear :
2010
fDate :
24-26 Dec. 2010
Firstpage :
19
Lastpage :
23
Abstract :
From the relevant interest game, this article establishes a tripartite game model involving enterprise, bank and government to analyze their behavior and their goal difference of how to influence the enterprise credit default. The model shows that for political and economic interests, the government implements the soft budget constraint to enterprise repayment through subsidies to bank and enterprise.
Keywords :
budgeting; credit transactions; game theory; credit soft budget constraint; enterprise credit default; enterprise repayment; goal difference; tripartite game model; Information science; credit default; game theory; soft budget constraint;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Information Science and Engineering (ISISE), 2010 International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Shanghai
ISSN :
2160-1283
Print_ISBN :
978-1-61284-428-2
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ISISE.2010.114
Filename :
5945042
Link To Document :
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