DocumentCode
2119282
Title
Supply Chain Coordination Based on the Information Asymmetry and Virtual Third Party
Author
Cheng, Hong ; Guo, Hongmei ; Wang, Xianyu
Author_Institution
Bus. Sch., Sichuan Univ., Chengdu, China
fYear
2010
fDate
24-26 Dec. 2010
Firstpage
179
Lastpage
183
Abstract
Information asymmetry widely exists in the supply chain. The supply chain cannot be coordinated easily because of it. But coordination is important to maximize the profit of supply chain. In this paper, the situation that supplier has adverse selection and the retailer has moral hazard for information asymmetry is considered. A virtual third party is introduced to develop an incentive model from the perspective of supply chain. The result shows that this method can coordinate the supply chain under information asymmetry. And the model is proved to be the same as that in real world.
Keywords
incentive schemes; outsourcing; profitability; supply chain management; incentive model; information asymmetry; profit maximisation; retailer; supply chain coordination; virtual third party; Contracts; Distribution functions; Ethics; Europe; Hazards; Mathematical model; Supply chains; adverse selection; information asymmetry; moral hazard; supply chain coordination; virtual third party;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Information Science and Engineering (ISISE), 2010 International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Shanghai
ISSN
2160-1283
Print_ISBN
978-1-61284-428-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ISISE.2010.83
Filename
5945080
Link To Document