• DocumentCode
    2119282
  • Title

    Supply Chain Coordination Based on the Information Asymmetry and Virtual Third Party

  • Author

    Cheng, Hong ; Guo, Hongmei ; Wang, Xianyu

  • Author_Institution
    Bus. Sch., Sichuan Univ., Chengdu, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    24-26 Dec. 2010
  • Firstpage
    179
  • Lastpage
    183
  • Abstract
    Information asymmetry widely exists in the supply chain. The supply chain cannot be coordinated easily because of it. But coordination is important to maximize the profit of supply chain. In this paper, the situation that supplier has adverse selection and the retailer has moral hazard for information asymmetry is considered. A virtual third party is introduced to develop an incentive model from the perspective of supply chain. The result shows that this method can coordinate the supply chain under information asymmetry. And the model is proved to be the same as that in real world.
  • Keywords
    incentive schemes; outsourcing; profitability; supply chain management; incentive model; information asymmetry; profit maximisation; retailer; supply chain coordination; virtual third party; Contracts; Distribution functions; Ethics; Europe; Hazards; Mathematical model; Supply chains; adverse selection; information asymmetry; moral hazard; supply chain coordination; virtual third party;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Information Science and Engineering (ISISE), 2010 International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Shanghai
  • ISSN
    2160-1283
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-61284-428-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ISISE.2010.83
  • Filename
    5945080