Notice of RetractionThe Coalmine Manager´s Safety Work Behavior in Optimal Incentive Model

Notice of Retraction

After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE\´s Publication Principles.

We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.

The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.

In order to reveal major factors constraining China\´s coalmine safety, the principal-agent relationship in China coalmine safety management is analyzed, a multi-task incentive model is constructed by setting different functions of production and safety performance, the coalmine manager\´s work behavior under optimal incentive contracts is analyzed and some meaningful conclusions are obtained. It is concluded that: it is actually an indirect principal-agent relationship that China government supervises coalmine manager; The effort level on safety work of coalmine manager decrease along with the risk level of safety work increasing, but increase along with the coefficient of effort-performance increasing. It is the underlying reason for "heavy production, light safety" that the risk lever of coalmine safety work is higher and the coefficient of effort-performance is lower. To urge coalmine manager improve the safety performance, it needs to take some outside measures.