Title :
Notice of Retraction
Managerial Perquisites and Shareholders´ Welfare Loss
Author :
Zhihui Gu ; Shiyun Zhang
Author_Institution :
Res. Center of Corp. Governance & Bus. Sch., Nankai Univ., Tianjin, China
Abstract :
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
This paper studies the agency cost due to managerial perquisites behaviors with the stochastic optimal control model. The results show that the agency cost is a descending convex function of the assets/debt ratio, i.e., the agency cost rises with managerial perquisites. Besides, based on a further study of the agency cost under the context of economic transition, we find that the agency behavior is characterized by being observable but unverifiable on condition that exogenous institutions are uncertain.
Keywords :
cost-benefit analysis; economics; stochastic processes; convex function; economic transition; managerial perquisite behavior; shareholder welfare loss; stochastic optimal control; Asset management; Contracts; Cost function; Fluctuations; Game theory; Optimal control; Pricing; Protection; Risk analysis; Stochastic processes;
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5303223
