DocumentCode
2146702
Title
Notice of Retraction
Effort´s Weakening of the Supervisor in the State-Owned Construction Project and Its Governance
Author
Guanghua Xie
Author_Institution
Bus. Sch., Central South Univ., Changsha, China
fYear
2010
fDate
24-26 Aug. 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
4
Abstract
Notice of Retraction
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
The paper analyses the quality control of state-owned constructing project from the angle of supervisor behavior, and points out that the state-owned properties of the constructing project are the causes of the effort´s weakening of supervisor, Incentive mechanism and monitoring mechanism can be to a certain extent complementary, especially when there is lack of supervision from the initial principal, the monitoring mechanism can effectively induce the supervisor to work hard, which is the inevitable choice to prevent the effort´s weakening of the supervisor in the state-owned constructing project.
After careful and considered review of the content of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE´s Publication Principles.
We hereby retract the content of this paper. Reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper.
The presenting author of this paper has the option to appeal this decision by contacting TPII@ieee.org.
The paper analyses the quality control of state-owned constructing project from the angle of supervisor behavior, and points out that the state-owned properties of the constructing project are the causes of the effort´s weakening of supervisor, Incentive mechanism and monitoring mechanism can be to a certain extent complementary, especially when there is lack of supervision from the initial principal, the monitoring mechanism can effectively induce the supervisor to work hard, which is the inevitable choice to prevent the effort´s weakening of the supervisor in the state-owned constructing project.
Keywords
construction industry; incentive schemes; personnel; quality control; incentive mechanism; monitoring mechanism; quality control; state-owned construction project; supervisor behavior; Compounds; Construction industry; Contracts; Economics; Government; Mathematical model; Monitoring;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5325-2
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5576122
Filename
5576122
Link To Document