Title :
Study on the Long Effective Mechanism of Construction Safety Supervision Management
Author :
Kongguo Zhu ; Shuquan Li
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Bus., Tianjin Univ. of Finance & Econ., Tianjin
Abstract :
In the paper, the game model between governmental construction safety supervision entities and contractors was established based on game theory. The difference of equilibrium point between general condition and the condition under voluntary accident report system has been discussed. The behaviors of governmental construction safety supervision entities and contractors have been analyzed. The paper discusses how to establish the effective supervision and incentive mechanism for construction projects safety management. It offered a new framework for construction safety supervision management.
Keywords :
accident prevention; construction industry; game theory; government policies; construction projects safety management; construction safety supervision management; contractors; game model; game theory; governmental construction safety supervision entity; incentive mechanism; voluntary accident report system; Accidents; Conference management; Costs; Finance; Financial management; Game theory; Information technology; Product safety; Project management; Technology management; Construction Safety Management; Game Theory; Incentive Machanism; Long Effective Mechanism; Supervision Management; Voluntary Accident Report System;
Conference_Titel :
MultiMedia and Information Technology, 2008. MMIT '08. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Three Gorges
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3556-2
DOI :
10.1109/MMIT.2008.63
