Title :
Evolutionary Game Analysis on Phenomena of Counterfeit Commodity
Author :
Lu, Fangyuan ; Qiu, Bingxian
Author_Institution :
Bus. Sch., Zhengzhou Univ., Zhengzhou
Abstract :
Analyzing the selecting action of strategy in interaction between the enterprises and the consumers and government in market with the evolutionary game theory: using duplicative dynamic studied the phenomenon of counterfeit commodity, according to the analysis of evolutionary game model, through long-term repeated game, learning and imitation, obtained the relevant evolutionary stable strategy. The result shows that if the income for producing counterfeit commodity of enterprises is larger than the income for producing normal commodity, or the supervising cost of government is too high, the counterfeit commodity emerge inevitably; enforcing the punishment for producing the counterfeit commodity of enterprises strictly, containing motive of producing counterfeit commodity of enterprises, enhancing income level of low-income groups, eliminating demand market of counterfeit commodity, are all the important ways to eliminate counterfeit commodity.
Keywords :
commodity trading; electronic commerce; evolutionary computation; game theory; counterfeit commodity; duplicative dynamic; enterprise; evolutionary game analysis; evolutionary stable strategy; imitation; income level; learning; long-term repeated game; low-income group; normal commodity; Costs; Counterfeiting; Counting circuits; Game theory; Government; Information analysis; Information technology; Law; Legal factors; Multimedia systems; counterfeit commodity; duplicative dynamic; evolutionary game; evolutionary stable strategy; game theory;
Conference_Titel :
MultiMedia and Information Technology, 2008. MMIT '08. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Three Gorges
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3556-2
DOI :
10.1109/MMIT.2008.122