DocumentCode :
2154106
Title :
The Research of Financial Distress Restructuring
Author :
Cao, Defang ; Zhao, Xinan ; Chen, Ke
Author_Institution :
SBA, NEU, Shenyang, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
20-22 Sept. 2009
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
5
Abstract :
This paper sets up models for the financial distress restructuring strategies in both cases that the interests of shareholder and manager are consistent or not in order to study the effect of restructuring strategies on the condition of "information asymmetry". Through the quantitative analysis of earning expectations of the shareholder, manager and creditor, this paper studied the optimal strategy of all the parties and their changes. Finally, this paper found that the two sides\´ optimal restructuring strategies to deal with financial distress were different when the interests of shareholder and manager were inconsistent. The manager could damage the benefits of the shareholder to maximize self-interest using his information advantage and domination. This article also addresses some corresponding recommendations to solve this issue.
Keywords :
financial management; financial distress restructuring; information asymmetry; optimal restructuring strategy; Contracts; Economic indicators; Financial management; Information management; Investments; Risk management;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4639-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5304045
Filename :
5304045
Link To Document :
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