Institutional tools for change

In many constitutional democracies a resource allocation system has evolved which bears little resemblance to that prescribed by their constitutions. Due to systemic features of these decision-making frameworks, powerful development interests now receive benefits from public resources that are (arguably) disproportionate to their reciprocal contribution to the general public. This has occurred because despite constitutional safeguards for preventing the abuse of power private interests were able to obtain control of public resources and hence, over time, more power to shape government processes and decisions. This transition from government to corporate prominence is generally shrugged off as the inevitable consequence of the democratic process. It is suggested here, however, that it is partly attributable to constitutional design, and that the shift in power should be reconceptualised as `systemic corruption´. The underlying argument is that environmental and social justice cannot be maintained without a system of government that is relevant to ecological realities. A model is proposed upon which the design of an ecological constitution could be based