• DocumentCode
    2175161
  • Title

    AIM: An Auction Incentive Mechanism in Wireless Networks with Opportunistic Routing

  • Author

    Zhang, Kun ; Wang, Rui ; Qian, Depei

  • Author_Institution
    Sino-German Joint Software Inst., Beihang Univ., Beijing, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    11-13 Dec. 2010
  • Firstpage
    28
  • Lastpage
    33
  • Abstract
    Opportunistic routing in wireless networks has strong requirement with nodes´ cooperation. But in most realistic networks, nodes perform in their own interests and refuse to forward packets for others when they belong to different organizations. The aim of this paper is to provide a fair incentive mechanism to encourage cooperation and achieve the energy efficient. We propose an auction incentive mechanism (AIM) using a fair pricing mechanism to incentive nodes and modeling the pricing process as an auction game. Furthermore, we proof that, this game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium point, and the profit of each relay node can be maximized when the game reached Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our simulation results show that the AIM can effectively incentive network nodes to relay data, so that the network throughput could be improved. And the energy consuming of nodes is balanced that enhances the stability of networks.
  • Keywords
    Bayes methods; game theory; incentive schemes; pricing; radio networks; telecommunication network routing; Bayesian Nash equilibrium point; auction game; auction incentive mechanism; fair pricing mechanism; network throughput; nodes cooperation; opportunistic routing; wireless networks; Bayesian methods; Energy consumption; Games; Nash equilibrium; Routing; Routing protocols; Throughput; auction game; incentive; opportunistic routing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computational Science and Engineering (CSE), 2010 IEEE 13th International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Hong Kong
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-9591-7
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-0-7695-4323-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSE.2010.13
  • Filename
    5692453