Dynamic Game Analysis of the Pure Public Welfare Project in the Concession Management Process

This paper mainly study the decision-making model on the concession term for pure public welfare project in the concession management process. The traditional pure public welfare project always adopted the single government supplying mode which can easily cause the lack of predominant investor and make the incentive and obligatory mechanism invalid. Eventually this may lead to the low efficiency of the project management. Learning from BOT financing mode, introducing concession management mode into pure public welfare project can not only absorb the diversified predominant investors who may bring about competition, but also solve the problem of fund shortage. Because the pure public welfare project doesn´t satisfy the conditions for charge and can´t generate future cash flow, its concession management mode also has some differences with BOT projects´. This paper mainly studies the pure public welfare project which doesn´t have cash income. After analyzing the characteristics of the pure public welfare project concession management mode, the paper establishes the game model on government and the project enterprise, discusses the relationship between concession term, construction cost of the project enterprise, compensation fees and so on, gets a decision-making model of the concession term and a calculation formula of construction cost which has been proved by empirical example. This model provides a concession term determination method of the pure public welfare project in its concession management process and has great theoretical value and practical application value.