DocumentCode :
2191680
Title :
A Model Explaining the Paradoxes of Private Benefits of Control
Author :
Ran Rong ; Yang Liu ; Yao Yuan
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Math & Comput. Sci., Chongqing Three Gorges Coll., Chongqing, China
fYear :
2009
fDate :
20-22 Sept. 2009
Firstpage :
1
Lastpage :
4
Abstract :
Researches related to PBC has found some inconsistent questions called Paradoxes of PBC under the formalism which considers that PBC is harmful to small shareholders. This theory reminds that present views on PBC may distort the nature of large shareholder encroachment. This paper introduces a model to explain the Paradoxes of PBC, and the results shows that some proper PBC has incentive effects. Furthermore, excessive PBC will be harmful to small shareholders and firm value, so it should be remedied.
Keywords :
stock markets; PBC paradox; incentive effect; private benefits-of-control model; small shareholder; Computer science; Control systems; Cost function; Cyclic redundancy check; Educational institutions; Law; Legal factors; Protection; Radio access networks; Weapons;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-4639-1
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5305422
Filename :
5305422
Link To Document :
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