DocumentCode
2198477
Title
How Do Companies Adjust Their Independent Directors after a Mishap?: Evidence from Independent Directors´ Background
Author
Zhang, Xinyi ; Zhou, Fan
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Tsinghua Univ., Beijing, China
fYear
2010
fDate
24-26 Aug. 2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
6
Abstract
The mission of independent directors is mitigating conflictions between majority and minority shareholders. This paper selects listed companies punished by CSRC or received qualified audit opinions from 2002 to 2004 as our target sample, empirically tests behavior and economic consequence of adjustment of independent directors. Empirical evidence shows that listed companies will increase independent directors with accounting background after a mishap to mitigate agent distress, and these companies enjoy significantly contemporaneous return after the adjustment.
Keywords
accounting; corporate modelling; organisational aspects; CSRC; accounting; agent distress; economic consequence; independent director; shareholder; Companies; Correlation; Economics; Educational institutions; Security; Watches;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5325-2
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-5326-9
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5578227
Filename
5578227
Link To Document