• DocumentCode
    2199152
  • Title

    R&D, Technology Spillovers and Firms Without Advantage

  • Author

    Liu, Huihuang ; Dai, Dier ; Yu, Ye

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Econ. & Trade, Hunan Univ., Changsha, China
  • fYear
    2009
  • fDate
    20-22 Sept. 2009
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    7
  • Abstract
    We analyze a two-country (developing country and developed country) game model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based on the productivity of imitation R&D, innovation R&D and intrafirm technology spillovers. The model presents the FDI strategies of developing country. Our main points are: first, at infant stage, when mutual investment becomes a Nash equilibria, technology-sourcing FDI undertaken by developing countries is most likely to succeed if external and intrafirm technology spillovers are sufficiently good and the size of markets is not too small. Second, at mature stage, if firms without advantage become strong enough through absorbing substantial technology spillovers, asymmetric FDI can occur, that is, leading firms in developed country give up FDI. Thus, there are strong motivations for China to conduct technology-souring FDI.
  • Keywords
    game theory; innovation management; investment; research and development; technology management; foreign direct investment; game model; imitation R&D; innovation management; intrafirm technology spillovers; research and development; technology-sourcing FDI; Educational institutions; Fault detection; International collaboration; Investments; Manufacturing industries; Power generation economics; Productivity; Regression analysis; Research and development; Technological innovation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4638-4
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-4639-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5305719
  • Filename
    5305719