DocumentCode
2199152
Title
R&D, Technology Spillovers and Firms Without Advantage
Author
Liu, Huihuang ; Dai, Dier ; Yu, Ye
Author_Institution
Coll. of Econ. & Trade, Hunan Univ., Changsha, China
fYear
2009
fDate
20-22 Sept. 2009
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
7
Abstract
We analyze a two-country (developing country and developed country) game model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) based on the productivity of imitation R&D, innovation R&D and intrafirm technology spillovers. The model presents the FDI strategies of developing country. Our main points are: first, at infant stage, when mutual investment becomes a Nash equilibria, technology-sourcing FDI undertaken by developing countries is most likely to succeed if external and intrafirm technology spillovers are sufficiently good and the size of markets is not too small. Second, at mature stage, if firms without advantage become strong enough through absorbing substantial technology spillovers, asymmetric FDI can occur, that is, leading firms in developed country give up FDI. Thus, there are strong motivations for China to conduct technology-souring FDI.
Keywords
game theory; innovation management; investment; research and development; technology management; foreign direct investment; game model; imitation R&D; innovation management; intrafirm technology spillovers; research and development; technology-sourcing FDI; Educational institutions; Fault detection; International collaboration; Investments; Manufacturing industries; Power generation economics; Productivity; Regression analysis; Research and development; Technological innovation;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Management and Service Science, 2009. MASS '09. International Conference on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-4638-4
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-4639-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICMSS.2009.5305719
Filename
5305719
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