• DocumentCode
    2205235
  • Title

    Study on the Moral Hazard of Developing Tourism Resources in China

  • Author

    Guo Chunfan

  • Author_Institution
    Manage. Sch., Jinan Univ., Guangzhou, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    24-26 Aug. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    4
  • Abstract
    Based on information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the moral hazard of developing tourism resources in China by the principal-agent theory. It links tourism revenues to the developing compensation. To solve the moral hazard, this paper designs an incentive and restrictive mechanism. Based on the model, the problems in the development are analyzed, and proposals of improving the mechanism are proposed.
  • Keywords
    social sciences; travel industry; incentive mechanism; information asymmetry; moral hazard; principal-agent theory; restrictive mechanism; tourism resource development; Companies; Contracts; Ethics; Hazards; Investments; Local government;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Management and Service Science (MASS), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Wuhan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5325-2
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5326-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICMSS.2010.5578500
  • Filename
    5578500
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=2205235