DocumentCode :
2208491
Title :
An algorithm for automatically designing deterministic mechanisms without payments
Author :
Conitzer, V. ; Sandholm, T.
Author_Institution :
Carnegie Mellon University
fYear :
2004
fDate :
23-23 July 2004
Firstpage :
128
Lastpage :
135
Abstract :
Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that a desirable outcome is reached even though the agents in the game behave selfishly. This is a difficult problem because the designer is uncertain about the agents?? preferences and the agents may lie about their preferences. Traditionally, the focus in mechanism design has been on designing mechanisms that are appropriate for a range of settings. While this approach has produced a number of famous mechanisms, much of the space of possible settings is still left uncovered. In contrast, in automated mechanism design (AMD), a mechanism is computed on the fly for the setting at hand??a universally applicable approach.
Keywords :
Algorithm design and analysis; Art; Computer science; Costs; Engineering profession; Permission; Probability distribution; Resource management;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004. AAMAS 2004. Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on
Conference_Location :
New York, NY, USA
Print_ISBN :
1-58113-864-4
Type :
conf
Filename :
1373471
Link To Document :
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